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The fields of cryptography and cybersecurity are awash with arcane and
highly technical language. In the following section, I will attempt to de-
mystify some essential concepts and place them in the context of tools like
SecureDrop.
Cryptography is the process of rendering a message unreadable to all but
the intended audience. In its original, readable form, a message is called
plaintext. The means of encryption, or rendering it unreadable, is called
a cipher. A cipher takes plaintext and combines it with a piece of secret
information, called a key, to produce the encrypted message, or ciphertext.
The proper key is required to decrypt the ciphertext back into the original
plaintext. A cryptosystem is the ensemble of tools and processes needed to
send and receive encrypted messages.
Cryptanalysis is code breaking. Whether by statistical analysis or ex-
haustive guessing, cryptanalysis is any means of turning ciphertext into
plaintext without possession of the key. When an adversary intercepts a
message, they may try to break the code through cryptanalysis to learn its
contents.
The grounding axiom of cryptographic theory is Kerckhoff’s Principle,
named after a nineteenth-century Dutch cryptologist. It states: A cryp-
tosystem should remain secure even if everything about that system besides
the key is public knowledge. The information theorist Claude Shannon later
rephrased this principle more succinctly, stating that one should assume
“the enemy knows the system.”1 This means that even if an adversary cap-
tures one of your encryption machines, or if your algorithm is open-source
software, the adversary should not be able to decrypt your messages unless
they have also intercepted your key. In short, the security of a cryptosys-
tem should be based on the secrecy of the key alone.
Key exchange is the process by which the parties of encrypted commu-
nications share the keys to encrypt and decrypt the messages they will
later send. This is traditionally the trickiest element of secure communica-
tion, especially in large organizations like the military. The strength of the
cryptosystem is immaterial, of course, if the key is stolen while it is being
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exchanged between parties. Since a secure channel seems to be needed for
the transmission of the key itself, the ideal means of secure key exchange
once seemed like an infinite regress problem.
The modern era of cryptography began with a novel approach to the
problem of key exchange devised by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman.2
Previous encryption systems had all been symmetric, meaning that the
same key was used to both encrypt and decrypt messages. Diffie and Hell-
man’s solution was for each party to have a private key that is kept totally
secret, and for both parties to use their private keys in a sort of handshake
to establish a secure channel. Models like this are called asymmetric or
public key cryptosystems.
A year after the arrival of Diffie-Hellman, a team of MIT researchers
developed the RSA algorithm, an alternative, proprietary, public-key cryp-
tosystem that became widely used for both encrypting and authenticating
messages. With RSA, each user has a widely available public key and a
completely secret private key. The public key is used any time someone
wants to encrypt a message to a specific person, while that person’s private
key is the only thing that can decrypt messages intended for them. A freely
distributed implementation of RSA called PGP was developed in the early
1990s and directly resulted in relaxed legal restrictions surrounding the use
of encryption by average citizens. Much of the cryptography in SecureDrop
and other secure communication systems relies at some level on PGP or
related, free software encryption tools like GPG.
The MIT key server is a directory for posting PGP keys, and its records
are used in this study as a proxy for the rate of adoption of encryption
tools in different newsrooms. When someone creates PGP/GPG keys, they
send the public key to one of these servers so that it can be found and
used when someone wants to send them an encrypted message. All the
major public key directories share data so that each key can be found and
confirmed in multiple places.
Yet cryptography is just one element of cybersecurity. Systems can be
compromised by many other means besides breaking codes or stealing keys.
A computer’s security measures can be circumvented if it receives malicious
code, grants access to an unauthorized user, or elevates user privileges so
that someone can execute commands beyond their intended limits. There
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is a vast and thriving market for novel ways of exploiting software, called
zero day vulnerabilities because they are not yet public knowledge. Once
a vulnerability has been revealed, and presumably also patched shortly
thereafter, the vulnerability is dated upward. The logic behind this system
is that even a ten-day vulnerability will still affect a targeted system if it
has not received security updates in a month.
Experts assess the risks and vulnerabilities of a particular system through
processes called threat modeling, security auditing, and penetration testing.
A threat model assesses the nature and likelihood of risks. A penetration
test is an attempt to identify vulnerabilities by subjecting the system to
realistic attacks. And a security audit is a comprehensive, professional as-
sessment of the risks, weaknesses, and needed improvements for a particular
system, often combining both penetration tests and threat models.
Hackers are typically classified as white hat, gray hat, or black hat ac-
cording to their ethical stance. The popular, broadly alarmist sense of the
word “hacker” generally refers to the black hats, who are motivated to ex-
ploit technological systems for amusement, personal gain, or sheer malice.
White hats use many of the same tools and techniques as black hats, but
they do so for the sake of identifying and correcting vulnerabilities. Gray
hats either believe that black- and white-hat tactics are appropriate in
different contexts, or they simply reject this strict moral binary.
SecureDrop is free and open-source software, meaning that every line of
its source code is freely available to read, modify, and share. In order to
emphasize that the “free” in this term refers not to cost but to freedom,
some advocates prefer the term libre software. Along with SecureDrop,
all of the leading secure communication tools like PGP/GPG and Tor are
maintained as free/libre/open-source projects. From a security perspective,
following Kerckhoff and Shannon, open code is considered a basic condition
for trusting any cryptosystem. When the code is closed to the public, there
is no way to know if it is well implemented, let alone if it contains a secret
backdoor. Open code, on the other hand, can be assessed for vulnerabilities
and improved upon by anyone participating in the project.






This report offers a guide to the use and significance of SecureDrop,
an in-house system for news organizations to securely communicate with
anonymous sources and receive documents over the Internet. SecureDrop
itself is a very young technology. It was developed over the last four years,
beginning during the period when the WikiLeaks submission system was
down and it was unclear how else whistleblowers could safely transmit large
caches of data to journalists.
The history of SecureDrop’s conception and development is thus en-
twined with some of the most striking moments in the recent history of
digital journalism: the arrival of Julian Assange as a charismatic force
calling for radical transparency; the remarkable life of the technology ac-
tivist Aaron Swartz; the bravery of Edward Snowden in revealing the level
of surveillance now exercised by government agencies worldwide; and the
resulting alliance between journalists, activists, and hackers who wish to en-
sure the accountability of powerful organizations by publishing information
in the public interest.
Through interviews with the technologists who conceived and developed
SecureDrop, as well as the journalists presently using it, this report offers a
sketch of the concerns that drive the need for such a system, as well as the
practices that emerge when a news organization integrates this tool into its
news gathering routines.
In general, I found a fairly narrow and consistent set of practices among
the journalists using SecureDrop. Many organizations designate just a
handful of employees to check their system, and these employees act as
operators, in a sense, who monitor the inbox and distribute promising
submissions to the reporter who is best suited to assess and potentially
act on that information. This is by far the most common model for the
coordination of SecureDrop in newsrooms, and it appears to be so common
largely because these practices were imprinted at the time of the system’s
initial, guided installation by the SecureDrop developers.
Given its complexity, SecureDrop may appear at first like a radical new
tool, but many reporters told me that it closely resembles many of the
other channels newsrooms have traditionally made available for sources
to contact them. The crucial difference is that SecureDrop restores the
effectiveness of a reporter’s privilege to protect their sources through prin-
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cipled non-cooperation—such as refusing to testify in court—whereas per-
vasive digital surveillance has made this gesture effectively moot over the
last decade. The reality is that when a reporter’s source can be identified
through digital traces, the prosecution does not even need that reporter
to testify. One of the explicit purposes behind developing SecureDrop has
been to restore the possibility for journalists to protect sources whose com-
munication devices might otherwise expose their identities.
Still, most readers must be wondering whether SecureDrop has proved
worthwhile. This is a difficult question to assess because journalists are
wary of revealing information that could put a source in danger. Still,
most of my informants, representing nine of the ten organizations studied
here, confirmed that the system has been generally valuable as a reporting
tool, if not particularly consistent. Many were not willing to disclose the
specific stories that originated with tips or documents from SecureDrop, nor
the frequency of these stories. Nearly everyone did confirm, however, that
the technical and often tedious process of checking the SecureDrop inbox
is worthwhile overall, both as a reporting tool and as a signal that their





SecureDrop is a platform designed to facilitate secure and anonymous
communication between sources and journalists. It is a complicated ensem-
ble of computers, running carefully configured software that can only be
accessed through a specific and deliberate set of procedures. This is espe-
cially true on the journalist’s side, where most of the difficulty is stacked by
design. One must log into a specific computer just to check the inbox, then
one must use a separate, totally isolated computer to view and print any
documents that have arrived. The process for the source is comparatively
simple, relying only on the user-friendly Tor anonymous browser, though
this process still requires a specialized tool and the initiative to use it. Such
a lopsided investment is quite deliberate: The primary value for the de-
signers of SecureDrop is to minimize the risk that the source—by far more
vulnerable than the reporter in the majority of cases—could be identified or
their messages intercepted en route.
For whistleblowers, choosing to reveal sensitive material has always
involved some level of personal risk, whether it means harassment, impris-
onment, or even physical violence. But technology today is uniquely suscep-
tible to monitoring that could endanger a whistleblower. We now know that
using computers, mobile phones, and other digital communication devices
is particularly hazardous for matters intended to remain private. Whether
information is skimmed in transit or seized from a data center, any number
of digital traces may identify and endanger whistleblowers. And when this
information is gathered without a warrant, it is immaterial whether the
leaked materials hold public value that justifies publication. SecureDrop
provides a secure and anonymous channel for sources to speak to journalists
from a position of relative safety.
At the time of writing, the Freedom of the Press Foundation (FPF)
directory lists thirteen news organizations, three independent journalists,
and eight nonprofit activist groups that are operating verified installations
of SecureDrop.3 The FPF estimates that there are currently thirty running
instances, including some that are not yet public. The organizations studied
in this report include Gawker, The Globe and Mail, The Guardian, The
New Yorker, ProPublica, and The Washington Post.
This list in no way indicates the limit of interest in SecureDrop: More
than eighty organizations are on the FPF’s waiting list. These organiza-
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tions are holding out for a guided installation not only because it is techni-
cally demanding to set up the equipment, but also because many journalists
will need assistance developing practical routines to make effective use of
the system. In short, the purpose of a guided installation is both to limit
the possibility of errors and security compromises, and to develop sound
routines for checking and making productive use of the system. This leads
to a fairly narrow set of practices surrounding SecureDrop. Unlike most
other new and emerging technologies, which are subject to varying degrees
of play and experimentation in their early stages, SecureDrop by its very
nature is often used within a fairly limited scheme of preconceived prac-
tices.
The purpose of this report is to sketch the use of SecureDrop at this
nascent but promising moment in its development, and to assess the role
it serves alongside other means of encrypted communication available to
reporters and their sources. To this end, I have conducted interviews with
twelve journalists and three technical administrators at ten organizations
using SecureDrop, as well as five people who are actively building the sys-
tem and training journalists to use it. Although small, this group reflects
a fairly comprehensive survey of SecureDrop’s present user base as of early
2016.
It is worth noting that the interviews for this report were often com-
plicated by the sensitive nature of the project itself. I began this work
knowing that the use of SecureDrop in newsrooms would be a difficult phe-
nomenon to examine. This is precisely why it seemed worthwhile to investi-
gate. Still, my conversations were circumscribed by rigid borders. Not only
were reporters wary of saying too much, but I was also bound by ethics
(and the guidelines of my Institutional Review Board) to recognize that I
could be placing others at risk, perhaps without even realizing it. The land-
scape of security hazards is broad and often largely unknowable, even for a
system as carefully designed and thoroughly tested as SecureDrop.
The level of secrecy surrounding the system is, of course, deliberate.
SecureDrop is designed to conceal as much as possible about the ways jour-
nalists and sources use it. At the time of this writing, the developers have
commissioned five separate professional security audits to find and cor-
rect vulnerabilities. Unlike many other encrypted communication systems,
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which are not just difficult to use but often used incorrectly, SecureDrop
minimizes the possibility for journalists and sources alike to misuse the
system and reveal identifying information.
The SecureDrop login and submission pages are only accessible via the
Tor web browser, which conceals both the users and the sites on its net-
work. If you were to fire up a Tor browser and click through to a Secure-
Drop submission page, you would see a page inviting you to log in, send
messages, and upload documents—all with massive forces of encryption
protecting your identity, location, and the contents of your transmission.
On the other side, journalists log into their own special-purpose computers
to check the inbox of messages and documents that sources have deposited
through SecureDrop.
Despite the apparent intensity of these security measures, many jour-
nalists using SecureDrop say that the system is more than just a lure for
high-impact stories: It reflects a commitment to do their utmost to pro-
tect sources who place themselves in danger for the greater public interest.
Whatever the actual level of risk for the source or the sensitivity of what
they have to share, a news organization offering SecureDrop is signaling
its respect for the level of protection that their source demands. Given
what we know (and don’t know) about systems of mass surveillance today,
this is a category of concern to which journalists have become increasingly
attuned.
As a result, many journalists were understandably cagey about dis-
cussing SecureDrop. Every single person I contacted for this study must
have at least considered the possibility that my stated intention as a re-
searcher was a falsity—that I could be working for “the other side.” And
even if my intentions were genuine, could these journalists trust me not to
commit a serious error in my handling of information? Could they even
trust our channels of communication? Of course not. The essential founda-
tion of a digital security mindset is a judicious and highly informed sense
of paranoia. And our interviews threatened to introduce a needless secu-
rity hazard to a system that is otherwise painstakingly hardened against
attacks.
In short, it was clear that my informants treated the possibility of re-
vealing sensitive information about sources quite seriously. This meant
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that most of them would not identify the stories that originated with in-
formation from SecureDrop. Although the majority did confirm that it
had happened and continues to happen, few would discuss the details of
reporting these stories. Information on their patterns of use, not to mention
the details of individual communications, could be enough for an adver-
sary to try to identify the source of a particular story. In the wake of the
Snowden revelations, these threats are not only plausible but fairly likely.
Consequently, some interviewees preferred to speak in generalities about
their process of assessing and then potentially acting upon tips that arrive
through SecureDrop.
So how does SecureDrop affect a newsroom once it arrives? Are there
new roles, reporting practices, or institutional configurations where Secure-
Drop is used?
Many of my informants explained that, as a point person using Secure-
Drop, they only monitor the system. If anything promising appears, they
direct it to the reporter covering the relevant beat. Consequently, these
point people often know very little about how the reporting process plays
out from there—that is, how the beat reporter verifies documents, follows
up on tips, and develops a broader picture of the issue at hand before filing
a story. Whatever the novelty of SecureDrop, these aspects of the tradi-
tional reporting process remain largely intact.
Occasionally, a single, technologically sophisticated reporter assumes
responsibility for the whole SecureDrop system. These rare cases require
little coordination and have a minimal effect upon the greater newsroom. If
the reporter leaves, the SecureDrop simply goes offline.
But in most of the newsrooms where I spoke to journalists using Se-
cureDrop, the process seems to be integrated at some level into the greater
newsroom. It is treated as a highly technical and sophisticated but largely
quotidian technology. It sits alongside many other devices that journalists
use to monitor information that may lead to further reporting. Like any
other information source, it is neither a guarantee of valuable leads, nor a
channel worth ignoring. SecureDrop appears to serve a unique and often
narrow, but decidedly useful role in the newsrooms using it.
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A Word on GlobaLeaks
Readers who have followed the development of secure whistleblowing plat-
forms may wonder why the GlobaLeaks system does not receive consid-
eration in this report. SecureDrop and GlobaLeaks share many qualities
in common—both were designed to facilitate secure communication with
whistleblowers; both are based around the Tor anonymous web browser;
both have been audited by security firms to test for weaknesses; and both
are free and open-source software developed to serve a role resembling
that of WikiLeaks. From a technical standpoint, GlobaLeaks is also con-
siderably less trouble to install than SecureDrop, which could be advan-
tageous in many circumstances. But the reality is that GlobaLeaks is not
being used by news organizations in the United States, Canada, or Great
Britain, which together form the empirical scope of this research. On the
other hand, GlobaLeaks has established a foothold in the Netherlands,
where fifteen news organizations collectively support a fork of the Glob-
aLeaks system called PubLeaks. Given that SecureDrop is the only se-
cure whistleblowing system being employed by news organizations in the
English-speaking world, however, it is the only platform addressed in this
report.
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At the 2014 Hackers on Planet Earth (HOPE) conference in New York
City, a panel announced the SecureDrop system as “a WikiLeaks for every
newsroom.”4 It was a provocative and topical proposal at an event held
in the wake of the Snowden disclosures, but many people must have been
asking: Why would every newsroom need its own WikiLeaks?
By the time the SecureDrop project was first conceived in 2012, Wik-
iLeaks itself was dealing with a staff mutiny, a shuttered submission sys-
tem, and Julian Assange’s self-imposed exile. Disaffected former staff had
launched a new project, OpenLeaks, but it failed to gain comparable trac-
tion. In short, there was not a clear successor, even as news audiences still
had an appetite for the brand of radical transparency that WikiLeaks had
pioneered. For Edward Snowden to orchestrate his leak of NSA documents,
it was necessary for him to devise his own digital security scheme from
publicly available tools. Using Tor, PGP encryption, an anonymous email
service called LavaBit, and a well-timed getaway, Snowden engineered the
safe delivery of the files to a handpicked selection of journalists during the
early months of 2013, right when the first prototype of SecureDrop was
launched as another solution to the momentary decline of WikiLeaks.
The SecureDrop project was originally devised by Kevin Poulsen, a se-
nior editor at Wired magazine and onetime fugitive hacker himself. Poulsen
had noticed that journalists were facing a gap in the news ecosystem that
Assange had so rapidly cultivated. “It bothered me that we had no dedi-
cated channel for people to communicate with us securely,” Poulsen said.
“WikiLeaks at one point had a useable system, and it seemed like if they
could do it, there should be a way for journalists to do it as well.” But
Poulsen envisioned an arrangement distinctly different from Assange’s
“middle-man” approach: He wanted to place this secure whistleblowing
platform in the newsroom itself.
So Poulsen reached out to Aaron Swartz to collaborate on this project.
Swartz was well known as an information activist and gifted computer
programmer. He had been an author of the RSS protocol at age fourteen,
a founder of the website Reddit, an architect of the Creative Commons
licenses, and one of the most ardent and vocal activists opposing the Stop
Online Piracy Act (SOPA).
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Writing in The New Yorker, Poulsen described Swartz as “a member of
a fairly small tribe with the skills to turn ideas into code—another word
for action—and the sensibility to understand instantly what I was looking
for: a slightly safer way for journalists and their anonymous sources to
communicate.”5
At the time, Swartz and Poulsen called their project “DeadDrop,” in
reference to a common element of spycraft. A dead drop is a designated,
hidden site where documents or messages can be dropped off and picked up
without participants ever needing to meet in person or know each other’s
identity. Similarly, the DeadDrop system was conceived to be an encrypted,
anonymous space where whistleblowers could safely deposit sensitive doc-
uments for journalists to retrieve and assess for publication, without the
whistleblower’s identity being exposed. Swartz and Poulsen collaborated on
the project in their spare time over the course of 2012, meeting to work in
person only once at the Wired offices in San Francisco.
Unfortunately, DeadDrop would be one of Swartz’s last projects. The
first version of the system was finished in December of 2012, just a month
before Swartz’s suicide in a Williamsburg, Brooklyn, apartment at age
twenty-six. Throughout the process of developing SecureDrop, Swartz had
been under federal investigation for attempting to download the entire
archive of academic articles from the subscription service JSTOR. His death
is often imputed to the overzealous prosecution of intellectual property laws
that Swartz himself had battled to prove unjust.
After Swartz’s death, Poulsen helped move the project from Wired to
another Condé Nast publication, The New Yorker, where it launched under
the name “Strongbox” in May of 2013. That day, staff writer Amy David-
son characterized the system as a much-needed asset. “Readers and sources
have long sent documents to the magazine and its reporters, from letters of
complaint to classified papers. But, over the years, it’s also become easier
to trace the senders, even when they don’t want to be found,” Davidson
wrote. “Strongbox addresses that; as it’s set up, even we won’t be able to
figure out where files sent to us come from. If anyone asks us, we won’t be
able to tell them.”6
But with Swartz gone, the project’s code base was effectively abandoned.
Without continued development, it was unclear if the system would ever
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become straightforward and robust enough to use beyond the prototype
developed within Condé Nast—even though Poulsen had intended from
the beginning for the code to be released open-source and used in other
newsrooms.
After several months of uncertainty, the project found new caretakers
when the Freedom of the Press Foundation asked Poulsen if it could adopt
DeadDrop and continue its development. Just one year earlier, the FPF
had been founded by two members of the Electronic Frontier Foundation
(EFF), the lawyer Trevor Timm and the technologist Micah Lee. The duo
launched the FPF largely as a crowdfunding site for journalism organi-
zations focused on transparency—especially WikiLeaks, whose donation
services had been blocked by many leading payment companies. Lee would
eventually help Laura Poitras and Glenn Greenwald learn to use encryp-
tion so they could communicate with an especially cautious source, Edward
Snowden. In short, the FPF had already situated itself at the nexus of
those concerns that grounded Poulsen’s project, so he trusted the founda-
tion to carry it forward.
First, Timm and Lee renamed DeadDrop as SecureDrop, and redesigned
the interface from its original appearance—a white-on-black, cloak-and-
dagger aesthetic—into something lighter and friendlier looking. The objec-
tive, after all, was to make the software more broadly usable and appealing.
The FPF also made several hires in order to support the development of
SecureDrop. These included the security expert James Dolan, who had
helped design the original DeadDrop project with Swartz and Poulsen at
Condé Nast, and a new lead developer for SecureDrop, Garrett Robinson,
who had previously worked at EFF and as a security engineer at Mozilla.
After adopting the project, the FPF also commissioned a professional
security audit to find any vulnerabilities that they would need to address
as they pushed the software forward. They hired some of the best: security
expert Bruce Schneier and a team from the University of Washington. That
team spent thirty hours just trying to install SecureDrop before giving
up. Although the group saw no obvious security flaws, this trial clearly
highlighted that the system was far too difficult and idiosyncratic in its
present state to be useful to others, let alone in the average newsroom.
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In all, the FPF team spent about ten months disentangling, hardening,
streamlining, and automating the SecureDrop code before releasing the first
working version (besides the original, still running at The New Yorker). In
October of 2013, the first SecureDrop systems were installed at Forbes and
BalkanLeaks. ProPublica followed in January 2014. By the summer, when
SecureDrop was billed at HOPE as a “WikiLeaks for every newsroom,”
there were over a dozen instances of SecureDrop running at some of the
world’s leading newspapers and activist groups. At the time of writing,
about thirty SecureDrop systems are running at news organizations and
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With SecureDrop systems installed in a handful of prominent news-
rooms, it is worth taking a critical look at whether—and if so, why—such a
tool is needed. After all, the system is difficult, time consuming, and highly
technical. Many news organizations may not have a staff member capable
of using it, nor the resources to hire someone.
This section will outline the principle security concerns for journalists,
the answers that SecureDrop provides, and the general framework in which
those capacities will be interpreted in later chapters.
Digital Security Practices in
Newsrooms
After Edward Snowden’s disclosure that the majority of web traffic is gath-
ered and surveilled by government agencies like the NSA, concerns about
computer security were no longer limited to the discourse of hackers and
privacy activists. In particular, journalistic interest in this subject gained
new urgency as the duty to protect one’s sources appeared to be increas-
ingly difficult to fulfill. A Pew poll from February 2015 found that sixty-
four percent of investigative journalists believe that they have been sub-
jected to surveillance by the U.S. government.7 The same poll found that
about half of these journalists had since taken measures to protect sensitive
documents they share, and thirty-eight percent had begun to use secure
communication tools with their sources.
Data from the directory of encryption keys at the MIT key server also
supports the increasing use of encryption tools among journalists.8 For this
study, I searched for keys registered to email addresses at a selection of
news organizations, including those running SecureDrop.i The figure below
shows the running total of PGP key registrations at some of the few news
organizations represented in the key directory. This figure also includes
an index line noting the date of the first published Snowden disclosures.
Although this event is probably not the sole cause of the rising use of en-
cryption among these journalists, it is clear that there has been a drastic
change from the relative flatline in most newsrooms beforehand.
i. Please see the appendix for more on data and methodology.
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A selection of news organizations and the number of their employees who have
registered encryption keys at the MIT public key server over time.
It is worth noting that journalists’ adoption of encryption tools has been
highly uneven: The vast majority of news organizations have no listings
at all in the directory. The major outliers are The New York Times and
the BBC, neither of which has a SecureDrop system in place. Nevertheless,
both have had a large number of employees register PGP keys at the MIT
directory over the last seventeen years—though their lines are omitted from
the graph above because they throw off the scale. While the BBC rate of
encryption-key registration has been fairly consistent over the last fifteen
years, The Times’s numbers began to climb at a faster rate in 2011; it
surpassed the BBC in early 2013, right before the Snowden disclosures.
The bar graph below shows the total number of PGP key registrations at
each of the news organizations I pulled from the MIT key server. The table
lists the number of registrations each year over the past decade.
Although these numbers provide some sense of which news organizations
have recognized the uses of encryption versus those which have ignored it,
these totals should not be read as raw indicators of digital security con-
sciousness from place to place. The BBC’s total of ninety-four PGP key
registrations reflects just half of one percent of its 18,974 total staff. On the
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The graph above with The New York Times and BBC included.
other hand, ProPublica’s thirteen registrations represent nearly a quarter of
its sixty employees.
Bearing in mind this limitation of the data, it is worth noting that the
benefits of increased PGP registration across newsrooms are not necessarily
cumulative. In the past, news organizations with just one or two journal-
ists set up with encryption have been contacted by sources who specifically
wanted to work with them. What is more problematic is the large number
of news organizations in which encrypted communication channels are com-
pletely absent, or where interested reporters do not have the opportunity to
be trained.
Anecdotally, several of my informants observed that the overall use of
digital security tools in their newsrooms appeared to increase after the
installation of their SecureDrop system. When the FPF developers visited
to oversee the installation of the SecureDrop system, then returned to check
up on it, these conversations sometimes prompted further steps among the
staff to encrypt hard drives, set up PGP keys for encrypting email, and
download the Tor anonymous browser or the Tails anonymous operating
system.
Still, this elevated attention to security rarely extends beyond the small
group of reporters who are trained to use the SecureDrop in each news-
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room. “That wasn’t something that we thought would scale to the whole
newsroom,” said Alasdair McKie of The Globe and Mail. “We really needed
to identify, who are the most invested recipients of that training, who are
most likely to take it to heart and actually use it in their day-to-day lives
as reporters.”
Comparing Encryption Systems
While the growing use of PGP encryption among journalists is a strong
signal that digital security has become a greater concern in the wake of the
Snowden disclosures, the contents of those disclosures suggest the limita-
tions of encrypted email for protecting sources.
Like many secure and encrypted communication tools available today,
encrypted email tends to protect only the content of messages. “There is
a pretty big ecosystem now of secure communication tools, but there are
very few that deal with anonymity and metadata protection,” said Micah
Lee of The Intercept. “And the reason is that this is a much, much harder
problem. A much easier problem, relatively speaking, is encryption.”
The array of metadata that accompanies an encrypted transmission
over email, phone, or chat is not only enough to prove that the commu-
nication has taken place, but also to pinpoint the parties, time, duration,
frequency, location, and the presence of files transmitted in the message. In
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some cases, this has been enough information not only to identify a whistle-
blower, but to prosecute.
“Not every source is an expert on being an anonymous source,” Poulsen
said. “That’s not why they’re contacting a reporter. It’s because they’re an
expert on something else.”
Timm framed the problem another way: “You can’t teach sources to be
secure, because you don’t know who the sources are.”
SecureDrop is designed to be as easy as possible for sources to use, while
still requiring them to take reasonable security precautions. Because Se-
cureDrop runs as a Tor hidden service, potential sources can only access its
submission system while they are under the anonymity protections of Tor
and, ideally, also the Tails secure operating system.
SecureDrop is particularly useful for facilitating a secure, anonymous
first point of contact between the source and journalist—which is a largely
unsolved problem in terms of secure communication. As Timm explained
it: “You have to make that first contact, and that first contact is almost
certainly going to be insecure, so SecureDrop is a way to have that point
of first contact.” Oftentimes, after beginning a conversation on Secure-
Drop, the journalist and source may choose to move the conversation to
another, more convenient venue like encrypted email, chat, or phone calls.
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For the journalist, this is especially valuable because it is better to know
your source’s identity, even if you do not plan to reveal it.
Still, the basic nature of digital security is that threats can never be to-
tally eliminated, only minimized along a greater number of possible avenues
of attack. This has remained the case over the long history of cryptography,
but it is compounded by the complexity of digital communications systems
today. Even the strongest encryption scheme can be circumvented through
the idiosyncrasies of software design and network pathways, not to mention
that users can easily and unwittingly make mistakes while using these tools.
Garrett Robinson, the lead developer of SecureDrop, said:
With a lot of this stuff, we don’t have a clear sense of what an adversary
could do, and so a lot of our thinking is just to make things harder for
them. It’s hard for us to say, “This solves a problem.” It’s more like, “This
raises a bar for an adversary.” But it’s not reasonable to assume that they
can’t get around it.
Poulsen noted that these dangers can be further minimized because
SecureDrop is a single-purpose system. “If you’re receiving tips on the
same system that you are using to send and receive routine emails, that’s
poor architecture. That’s not a good idea,” he said. “So that was the idea
originally behind SecureDrop. Here, we’re going to have one little box that
does nothing except stay secure, stay updated with patches, and be utterly
dedicated to this one purpose of handling sensitive communications. And
that is something that nobody had before.”
Legal Protections of SecureDrop
“People think of SecureDrop as a technical tool,” said Timm of the FPF,
“but it’s almost as much a legal tool.” He pointed to the recent history
of journalism to explain the specific needs that SecureDrop was designed
to address. Since the 1970s, he said, journalists had banded together and
produced “one of the most effective civil disobedience campaigns since the
Civil Rights era.” They effectively refused to testify against sources and
would voluntarily go to jail to avoid doing so. This led many states to
pass shield laws, which protect the reporter’s privilege not to disclose their
interaction with sources. There is not yet a federal shield law, but many
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federal circuit courts at least provide some limited privilege for journalists
based on the First Amendment.
In leak cases during the Obama administration—the largest number filed
under any U.S. president—none has required a reporter to testify. In the
James Risen case, one reporter was subpoenaed, but federal prosecutors
eventually dropped the subpoena and then easily convicted the source using
electronic records from the government.
“I think a major reason that there have been so many prosecutions of
sources in the past decade,” Timm said, “is that the government figured out
that they didn’t need reporters to testify against their sources anymore.”
The legal advantage of SecureDrop is that the servers reside on the me-
dia organization’s property. Thus, no one else has access to it. When both
the source and the journalist are using this system to communicate, they
are only connecting to the server on the newsroom premises. There are
no third parties who could be subpoenaed to release information, so the
news organization can conceivably return to fighting battles over reporter’s
privilege even if information is communicated over a digital channel. Timm
explained:
Let’s say The Washington Post publishes a blockbuster story and they
say that SecureDrop was used—or the government thinks SecureDrop
was used. If they want to subpoena someone, they need to serve it on the
news organization, and that means we can re-trigger the right that these
organizations have lost over the past decade, which is that they will have
the ability to challenge the subpoena before handing over the information—
to go to a judge and say that this violates the First Amendment. They will
have the ability to appeal it and ultimately reserve the right to be held in
contempt of court rather than hand it over.
This will really make the bar for the government a lot higher. Number one,
maybe the government just won’t issue the subpoena in the first place,
because they know it will be difficult and they won’t want the public fight.
Number two, even if the news organization ultimately loses after a years-
long court battle, hopefully SecureDrop collected so little data on the source
that it would be useless to the government anyways.
By comparison, even the strong protections of encryption systems like
PGP email only conceal the contents of messages. They do not conceal the
fact that communication has taken place between two parties, and in some
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cases that may be enough to endanger the source. No matter how difficult
it is to break the encryption, if your source sends an email from anything
besides a personal server, there is little to stop either eavesdropping on the
transmission of that message or the seizure of records from the provider.
SecureDrop solves both of these problems.
A Rare Exception to Post-Industrial
Journalism
The fact that SecureDrop must reside on the premises of each news organi-
zation makes it somewhat unique among the new tools and platforms that
journalism organizations use to connect with the public. Many journalists
and their employers now post their stories to social media sites like Twitter
or Facebook, which currently serve as some of the most influential portals
for readers to find news and entertainment.
For Emily Bell, professor of Journalism and director of the Tow Center
at Columbia, this indicates that news organizations are losing control over
their distribution channels as more of their work is consumed through a
network of social media platforms. “Social media and platform companies
took over what publishers couldn’t have built even if they wanted to,”
Bell wrote in a recent piece for the Columbia Journalism Review. The
choices the companies running these social networks make—on matters like
whether to permit ad-blocking software—may now be the main factor in
determining the fates of publishers.9
SecureDrop is a notable exception to this state of affairs—sometimes
characterized as a move toward “post-industrial journalism”—in which
news organizations allow outside parties to manage more of the gathering
and distribution of their content.10 The SecureDrop servers must reside
within the newsroom, first and foremost because this location is under its
control and is granted the legal protections the US affords to its press. If
the organization placed the system on a server farm, or used any seemingly
secure communication platform run by a third party, its data could be
seized without any consideration for the effect it might have on the freedom
of the press. This seizure could also happen without their knowledge.
SecureDrop, by working to restore the press protections that have proved
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elusive in the context of digital media, is at once an undeniably advanced
technology, and also one developed to reassert the past conditions of jour-
nalistic practice. The SecureDrop system cannot be outsourced without
losing the key pillars of its security model, so its place in the newsroom is
fixed even as the conditions of post-industrial journalism may rapidly push
other fixtures of the newsroom further afield.
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In order to understand the landscape of different newsrooms using Se-
cureDrop, the following section outlines case studies of five organizations:
The Intercept, The Washington Post, Gawker, The Globe and Mail, and
ProPublica. PGP registration numbers for these five organizations plus The
Guardian can be compared in the graph below.
Public key enrollments over time at a selection of organizations using SecureDrop.
Please note that due to differences in total staff at these organizations, direct
comparisons are difficult.
The Intercept
The Intercept is an online publication established in the wake of the Snow-
den disclosures by eBay founder Pierre Omidyar. Many of its current staff
reporters and technologists were involved in reporting these disclosures,
including Glenn Greenwald, Laura Poitras, and Micah Lee. Consequently,
The Intercept is unique among news organizations in its focus on digital
security, including mandatory training for its staff.
The organization’s concern for security is borne out by the large number
of staff members enrolled on the MIT key server. The graph below shows
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the accumulated total registrations among employees of The Intercept and
its parent company, First Look Media.
Number of public key registrations over time at The Intercept and First Look Media.
Beyond its large footprint on the MIT key directory, The Intercept is
also notable because it launched in early 2014 with SecureDrop running
from day one. Lee, one of the founders of the FPF and one of the develop-
ers of SecureDrop, not only set up The Intercept’s system, but was also the
sole staff member checking it for some time.
Recently, a “centralized group” has joined Lee in reviewing submissions
and distributing materials when a source is trying to contact a specific
journalist. Betsy Reed, the editor of The Intercept, described this as a
time-consuming but manageable process. “We had to get into a rhythm
for checking the SecureDrop. It works best to do that on a rotating basis
because there can be a high volume of material to get through, but we’ve
gotten into that rhythm.”
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Reed also confirmed that her organization has had an increasing level
of success with SecureDrop. “Especially recently, as awareness grows of
its existence, we’ve seen more and more good stories coming out of that
pipeline,” she said, adding, “but as with any kind of tip line at any news
organization, the vast majority of leads we get, they don’t pan out.”
Lee echoed that while The Intercept frequently receives tips and doc-
uments in its SecureDrop system and that a fair share of them warrant
further reporting, they pass on the majority of material. “It’s very frequent
that we get contacted through SecureDrop and the information we have
is kind of interesting, and we talk about it for a while, but then we decide
that it’s not interesting enough to warrant doing more journalism around it,
or publishing anything,” he said. “Because, you know, most sources don’t
have incredibly juicy stories for you. That’s pretty rare.”
Like other publications studied here, The Intercept does not make a
practice of acknowledging when the source for a story contacted the outlet
through SecureDrop. The first exception came in November 2015, when
The Intercept published a story about a company called Securus that pro-
vides phone services to prisons. The journalism hook was that Securus was
recording phone calls between inmates and their lawyers in violation of
attorney-client privilege. The lede paragraph stated:
The materials—leaked via SecureDrop by an anonymous hacker who be-
lieves that Securus is violating the constitutional rights of inmates—
comprise over 70 million records of phone calls, placed by prisoners to
at least 37 states, in addition to links to downloadable recordings of the
calls.11
Lee explained that the decision to reveal the use of SecureDrop in re-
porting the Securus story was the result of assessing the potential risk to
the source, who dropped out of contact shortly after delivering the doc-
uments. “In this specific case, we looked into it and we couldn’t see any
harm that could be done to our source, or our source’s identity, by saying
that it came from SecureDrop. We don’t know the actual identity of our
source, but we were able to validate the information.” Two weeks later, The
Intercept posted a second story with direct acknowledgement that it was
based upon documents sent through SecureDrop, but these acknowledg-
ments are still rare.12
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Reed underscored that these decisions are not specific to SecureDrop:
“We have to evaluate the risks of disclosing any details about sourcing—
including whether it comes via Securedrop—on a case by case basis, taking
into account when possible the source’s assessment of their own risks, but
also making our own independent assessment.”
The Washington Post
For Barton Gellman, one of the reporters who handled the Snowden disclo-
sures for The Washington Post, learning to use encryption tools only proved
useful after much waiting. “I published my first PGP key in 2006,” Gellman
said. “I was up and running with encryption and Tor for seven years before
Edward Snowden found his way to my inbox. He could not have reached
me if I had not left out the welcome mat.” Gellman now runs his own per-
sonal SecureDrop at the Century Foundation, but The Post itself was also
an early adopter of SecureDrop, launching the system in June of 2014.
The Post appears to have developed an efficient system to monitor its
SecureDrop. According to Steven Rich, a database editor for investigations
at The Post, they have a team of three journalists who gather, assess, and
distribute tips to reporters around the newsroom. Trevor Timm of the
FPF even surmised that The Post may have the “best coordinated” system
among all the organizations currently using SecureDrop.
When asked if SecureDrop has been successful at The Post, Tate replied,
“Definitely. I can’t go into what those stories are. But we’ve had success
with it, definitely.”
“We spend a fair amount of time trying to figure out what something is
and where it should go,” said Julie Tate, one of the journalists who mon-
itors the SecureDrop at The Post. After delivering each tip, Tate and the
other point people will respond to the source through the SecureDrop in-
terface to let them know a reporter is looking into it. They also give some
expectation of how further contact will be coordinated if the story moves
forward.
“If I hook up a reporter with a source, often I’m not involved anymore—
one hundred percent of the time I’m not involved anymore,” Tate said.
“I’m like, this is what we’ve received, this is how this person can commu-
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Number of public key registrations over time at The Washington Post.
nicate with you—you know what I mean? It’s like introducing two people,
and then I step out. I’m just facilitating people communicating with each
other.”
Rich said that interesting tips tend to receive about a week or two for
pre-reporting before a full investigation is launched. “You don’t generally
get entire stories leaked,” Rich said. “You get the tip of the iceberg.”
Rich also noted that most people in The Washington Post newsroom are
aware of SecureDrop, but the majority don’t use it. Moreover, he said that
many reporters mistakenly think they do not need it. “Most people work
with more sensitive things than they think they do,” Rich explained.
Although the majority of the newsroom may not use SecureDrop, others
are using tools like PGP instead. According to Tate, all of The Post’s for-
eign reporters use encryption tools of some kind. Data from the MIT key
server reveals that the enrollment of Post reporters with encryption keys
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increased noticeably after the Snowden disclosures were published, while
the installation of its SecureDrop system appears to have had little effect.
Gawker Media
Gawker Media, a company operating a network of single-subject blogs,
promotes its SecureDrop system with considerable bravado. Each day, an
automated post lists the various channels through which a source might
choose to contact them:
Don’t forget: You can email us tips at tips@Gawker.com, call them in at
646-470-4295, send them directly to any of our writers, or use our anony-
mous SecureDrop system.
John Cook, executive editor of Gawker Media, said that adding Secure-
Drop to this post was a natural extension of their usual efforts to gather
material from readers:
That was always there just to get tips through email or our phone tips line.
So this was a daily post that went up—we call them blips—that go up in
the daily flow of the site just to remind people how to contact us, how to
send us tips, and so when we got SecureDrop set up and installed we added
SecureDrop to that blip across all the sites just to remind people that it’s
there.
Cook admitted that Gawker ’s SecureDrop is particularly prone to un-
wanted and often grotesque submissions. “Aside from people sending us cat
videos and stuff, we do have an army of very dedicated trolls coming after
us.” Cook added that this class of submission is “probably pretty unique to
Gawker, or at least more energetic when directed at Gawker.”
According to Cook, who worked at The Intercept before returning to
Gawker Media, his staff has an established routine to check SecureDrop
for promising tips. “We have three people who are trained on checking
it,” he said. “They check it and then write up an email report every day
about what’s in it, and send it around to a limited group. And then we just
go from there on what to pick up on, and who to respond to, and who to
communicate with.”
Cook added: “We just treat these as tips and farm them out to people
who are available and suited to pursue the story.”
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When asked about the character of the useful tips in its SecureDrop,
Cook said that they receive a “healthy variety of material,” but that the
bulk of journalistic material tends to be directed at “Gawker” itself, its
sports blog “Deadspin,” its feminism blog “Jezebel,” or its automotive blog
“Jalopnik.”
Asked whether the platform has proved useful as a reporting tool, Cook
said yes, and elaborated that his staff has been working on a long-running
and potentially promising investigation based on a tip from SecureDrop:
“The best one—which I wouldn’t feel comfortable talking about—is some-
thing that we’re still working on, and it’s been a long-term thing, but I
don’t want to talk about it.”
Like many publications, the number of Gawker reporters registering pub-
lic encryption keys jumped in recent years, noticeably in the months pre-
ceding its installation of SecureDrop. Although a total of fourteen Gawker
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employees are on the MIT key server, Cook said that only about five of
them use encryption regularly.
The Globe and Mail
In March of 2015, Toronto’s Globe and Mail installed the first SecureDrop
in Canada. In an article announcing the launch, The Globe’s editor-in-chief
David Walmsley wrote, “SecureDrop is the 21st-century equivalent of the
manila envelope: It provides you with an anonymous venue for relaying
material you believe to be in the public interest and you have no other way
to get it out publicly.”13
Deputy production editor Alasdair McKie, who is one of the primary
caretakers and facilitators of The Globe’s SecureDrop, said that the system
quickly proved itself useful, yielding a story almost immediately after its
launch. The use of the system is largely tied to The Globe’s investigative
team. A handful of these reporters have been trained to use SecureDrop
and check it roughly three times a week for promising material.
McKie’s account of messages received in its SecureDrop also suggests
that The Globe might be less afflicted by spam and trolls than other news
organizations. “The majority of the submissions that we’ve received, I
would call good faith submissions from potential sources,” McKie said. He
continued:
They’re not intentionally wasting our time. They’re not intentionally send-
ing us something that’s not of journalistic value. They’re not sending us
garbage on purpose just to yank our chain. That is not super common. It
does happen. But it’s not something that’s been a problem for us.
Like most other informants in this study, McKie declined to point to spe-
cific cases in which tips and documents from SecureDrop led to published
stories. Furthermore, he said that The Globe established an explicit policy
before launching SecureDrop that their organization would never, under
any circumstances, indicate that a source had come through this particular
channel.
Beyond its use as a reporting tool, McKie also highlighted that run-
ning SecureDrop reflects an awareness of our society’s present surveillance
dilemma and a respect for the press’s role in highlighting this reality:
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The fact that there are people who are willing to contact us over Secure-
Drop, who are not willing to contact us through another avenue, under-
scores for people not just the editorial leadership in the newsroom, but also
just the company in general, that information security is a fact of life now.
And some of the other initiatives, like getting people signed up with PGP
keys and that sort of thing, is something that is going to be part of our
lives. And the sooner we incorporate that into the way we go about our
business, the better it is for news organizations, in particular, because we
are the focus of policy-making information in our society.
According to records at the MIT key server, only a few Globe and Mail
staff members were registered with PGP before their organization’s Se-
cureDrop was installed. McKie said that many of the advances in security
training in their newsroom took place in preparation for the installation of
SecureDrop. Records also indicate that the majority of Globe PGP keys
were registered in the months following the launch of its SecureDrop. Dur-
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ing the 2015 calendar year, twenty-eight more of the paper’s journalists
registered PGP keys, placing The Globe in the top third of organizations
studied here in terms of total registrations. It ranks just ahead of The Wall
Street Journal and just below the The Guardian.
ProPublica
ProPublica was the third organization to install a SecureDrop system after
the FPF rebooted the project, and yet it was also the only organization
whose representatives stated that SecureDrop has not been a particularly
successful source of stories.
Instead, ProPublica staff articulated a broader spectrum of uses for
SecureDrop. Assistant Managing Editor Scott Klein said: “We don’t see
SecureDrop exclusively as a way for anonymous whistleblowers to send us
the proverbial plain brown envelope’ full of data, because that’s actually
a pretty rare event. We also see SecureDrop as an ideal way for sources
we know to send us data and documents in an environment where the
anonymity and security are turned up to eleven.”
For instance, a source was communicating with a ProPublica reporter
over encrypted email to exchange a cache of documents but found they
could not transmit such a large volume of data due to the brute limitations
of the email system itself. ProPublica’s reporter then advised the source to
deposit the files through SecureDrop instead. In this case, SecureDrop was
neither a first point of contact nor, in a strict sense, an anonymous one.
Mike Tigas, who maintains ProPublica’s SecureDrop, said he logs in
to check the system about once a week, and that the whole process takes
about an hour. Tigas said that a few useful tips have come through mes-
sages dropped into the system, but none of these have become an active,
repeat source. He estimated that a new source comes to ProPublica’s Se-
cureDrop with a potential story about once a week, but that these are
rarely useful leads.
Asked whether ProPublica would cite SecureDrop in the event that a
major story originated in the system, Tigas said there isn’t a firm policy in
place: “We haven’t had too many of these situations and we publish slowly
enough that I think that decision will continue to be made on a per-project
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basis. We’d definitely consider touting SecureDrop if the circumstances
were right.”
Tigas also noted that many ProPublica reporters prefer to use PGP
email for sensitive conversations because they are working with known—
rather than anonymous—sources. He estimated that about ten reporters
regularly use PGP with a total of about fifty regular sources. Based on
the key server registration figures, ProPublica’s enrollment had a slight
spike after the Snowden revelations and once more after the outlet installed
SecureDrop.
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Based on the accounts outlined in earlier chapters, several themes
emerged that characterize the general experience of using SecureDrop.
For one, materials that gravitate to SecureDrop inboxes tend to fall into a
handful of distinct categories. The routines, practices, and general percep-
tion of SecureDrop also tend to be fairly consistent across organizations.
Categories of Submission:
What Turns Up in SecureDrop?
“The ratio of wheat to chaff is unsurprising,” said Barton Gellman. His
personal SecureDrop received more than five hundred messages in the
twenty months between July 2014 and January 2016. Of those, he said
about one hundred unique user names were registered, but these did not
necessarily indicate unique visitors. Overall, Gellman said that fewer than
ten percent of his SecureDrop contacts provided “useful information,” but
of these only three contacts were able to provide him with “significant
and journalistically valuable” information. It bears repeating that three
whistleblowers in less than two years is still a considerable success rate.
Nevertheless, for the sake of source protection, journalists are often not at
liberty to describe the worthwhile materials they receive—whether these are
troves of spreadsheets, images, PDFs, or emails they review for veracity and
journalistic value.
Consequently, the journalists I interviewed were far more willing to dis-
cuss the junk they receive. The following section outlines categories of com-
mon submissions that need to be discarded in search of useful journalistic
material in SecureDrop.
Security Testing
Several informants said that some of the most common messages to pop-
ulate their SecureDrop inboxes arrive from white-hat hackers performing
security tests on the system. Gellman said that many messages explicitly
state that they are merely “checking the system setup for flaws or confirm-
ing it is online.” The SecureDrop developers do offer a “bug bounty” for
those who find flaws in the system, so these messages are most likely sent in
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order to check for potential information leaks or openings where the system
may be breached.
Malware
Despite the intense precautions of the SecureDrop developers, some sub-
missions arrive harboring malware. Gellman noted that it is especially
important for journalists to be wary of file types where malware is com-
monly hidden, such as PDFs and DOC files. Gellman specifically recounted
catching malware in several submissions to his SecureDrop. “One upload
consisted of what purported to be a long list of stolen credit card numbers,
and there was malware embedded in the submission,” he wrote in an email,
adding that “there have been three other confirmed deliveries of malware.
Those could have posed a meaningful risk to the security of the system, but
I do not (ahem) run executable files.”
Spam
As with any system where submissions are unfiltered and unmonitored,
there is essentially no way to eliminate spam from SecureDrop. Cook of
Gawker recalled being subjected to an especially nasty barrage of unwanted
messages when his system first got off the ground. “When we launched, we
were beset by trolls, so there were a lot of horrible images of dead bodies,
and porn, and people uploading massive videos just to gum up the system
and take up time,” he said. “The first three or four days checking it were
just a nightmare.” Although these sources of noise are perhaps unavoidable,
many outlets said the level of spam they receive is low and easily managed.
Tips of Limited Value
Mike Tigas said that ProPublica’s SecureDrop does not receive “spam” in
the sense of “people trying to mess with them,” but that irrelevant sub-
missions result more often from people trying to act as sources when in
actuality they don’t really have anything of journalistic value to share. This
seems to be due to an ordinary lack of news judgment.
McKie of The Globe and Mail shared a similar account, but also de-
fended the value of tips that may not be offering secret or previously un-
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known material, because these may alert reporters to what readers consider
important. “Sometimes just the fact that they sent it to us is enough to
kind of twig us, journalistically, to a potential story,” he said.
Tate of The Washington Post echoed this:
Sometimes it is very confusing, because people are sending you pages from a
published book. But what they’re trying to do is put context around those
pages. You know, it’s not like they’re sending you a page from a book and
saying that this should be a secret communication. They’re saying, “Look
at this page in this book and let me explain to you what is happening here.”
Conspiracy Theories
Other failures of news judgment receive little sympathy. Many journalists
are all too familiar with messages from an eager source with no credible
evidence to back up their claims. SecureDrop seems to be particularly
inviting for these sources. Gellman said that he has received about twenty
unique communications from people offering him “elaborate and implausible
theories.”
The majority of my interviewees confirmed receiving this category of
submission, but Tigas of ProPublica said he encounters messages like these
no more than once a month. Cook of Gawker seemed more accepting and
even somewhat entertained by these characters: “SecureDrop is very wonky
and labor intensive. It’s difficult and it’s a pain in the ass. By nature, it
attracts people who are paranoid and distrustful. So interacting with the
people who come to you through that channel, it’s always interesting.”
McKie of The Globe and Mail noted that SecureDrop may actually have
a slightly higher signal-to-noise ratio than other channels the public may
use to contact journalists:
We’ve had the newsroom telephone line for decades and it’s always been
called the “crank line,” and there’s a reason for that. SecureDrop doesn’t
change that. If anything, SecureDrop raises the barrier to entry so that peo-
ple have to work a little bit harder to get in touch with us, but if you com-
pare SecureDrop to other means, people seem to be a lot more motivated.
They’re not just doing it for fun, and as a result what you get is people who
believe, for whatever reason, that there’s a story in what they’ve sent you.
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Hoaxes and Fakes
A separate genus of unreliable stories includes those that are deliberately
false. Gellman said that he was contacted by a “sophisticated fabricator”
offering forged documents using a “well-planned and well-executed fake
persona,” which took Gellman some time to debunk. This underlines the
importance of approaching material in SecureDrop, like anything else, with
proper skepticism and subjecting it to rigorous verification. In Gellman’s
case, this was time consuming, but he also said it was “a net positive for
me as a learning exercise.”
Over the Transom
One of the interesting properties of SecureDrop is that it essentially offers
a direct connection to an editor. Many writers covet this level of access,
especially when they are accustomed to submitting their work to slush piles
heaping with other literary hopefuls. At The New Yorker, for instance, ed-
itor Jeremy Keehn said that when they first launched SecureDrop, “more
than half of the submissions were fiction or poetry.” None of these sub-
missions were accepted for publication in The New Yorker, and Keehn
encouraged these writers to use conventional channels in the future.
Newsroom Practices
According to my interviews, the uses of SecureDrop fall into a fairly narrow
set of practices. This is due, in part, to the design of the system. It is engi-
neered to limit the possibility of security failures, which necessarily means
limiting the range of possible actions for users. This much is logical and un-
surprising. But the on-site installation and training from the FPF appears
to be an equally important factor in the range of practices by SecureDrop
users.
Checking the System and Distributing Tips
In most newsrooms, a group of four or fewer reporters is tasked with check-
ing the SecureDrop at least once a week. The most common rate of check-
ing reported was three times weekly. Once they have identified promising
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submissions, the reporter determines which of the organization’s reporters
is best suited to assess and follow up on the tips or documents received.
The exception to this check-and-distribute model is with personal Se-
cureDrops. Poulsen views his SecureDrop as a tool he offers for people who
specifically want to contact him. He said that he checks his system “reg-
ularly” and that it gets “plenty of use,” but he declined to offer details of
his interactions with sources. Gellman also gives a fairly generous level of
attention to those who leave messages on his personal SecureDrop. “I gen-
erally respond to every submission that is not essentially empty or pure
trolling,” he said. “I find that people are grateful and sometimes surprised
to hear back.”
There is also no guarantee that a journalist will hear back from a source
after their first appearance in the system. For this reason, some organiza-
tions said that they would attempt to move the conversation off SecureDrop
and onto another, more convenient encrypted channel as soon as possi-
ble after the first point of contact. Otherwise, there is a risk that a useful
source will disappear and not return to carry on the conversation, even if
the reporter wants to push forward with the story.
Verification
Like any tip or document, materials in SecureDrop must be subjected to
journalistic verification. Cook of Gawker said the process is exactly what
one would expect in traditional scenarios. “There’s nothing unique about
the SecureDrop system,” he said. “It’s the same thing we do with anything
you get, which is you do regular old reporting to verify it—to see if it will
stand up.”
Rich also pointed to a traditional journalistic skillset for assessing what
arrives in The Post’s SecureDrop: “Throughout investigative reporting,”
he said, “you get a sense for what tips you can use and which ones you can
just throw away.”
One aspect of verification that journalists may not have at their disposal
when using SecureDrop, though, is the identity of the source. Poulsen said:
My preference as an old-school journalist is that I like to know who I’m
talking to. But part of the idea behind SecureDrop is that in this age right
now, it’s harder to make guarantees that somebody’s identity is going to re-
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main secret. The government has so many ways of surveilling journalists—
and they show a willingness to use it—that I think the bar for accepting
information from somebody whose identity is a mystery even to the re-
porter, I think that is now by necessity a bar that we reach more easily
than in the past.
Nondisclosure of SecureDrop Stories
Although most journalists using SecureDrop told me they consider it a
useful reporting tool, they were mostly unable to disclose the stories that
originated with information from sources on SecureDrop. Thus, it could
easily appear as though the journalistic footprint of SecureDrop is rather
small.
McKie of The Globe and Mail said that they take a strict editorial
stance on this point: “Before we launched SecureDrop, we adopted the
explicit policy that we would not acknowledge that it was the source for
any given story.”
To date, The Intercept is the only publication to have acknowledged
when published stories have arrived through SecureDrop.14 They have since
acknowledged a total of three in print, but Lee maintains that these are
not the only Intercept stories to originate with tips or documents from its
SecureDrop.
Cook of Gawker added:
It’s kind of a Catch-22 in that one of the things I’ve always wanted to do is
to say, “Hey, we got this through SecureDrop.” But you don’t want to do
that, because you don’t want to do anything that would lead someone to
try to go look if someone’s work laptop has Tor on it, or whatever might
lead to suspicion.
Placing SecureDrop Alongside Other Communication Chan-
nels
Another theme that has emerged from studying SecureDrop is that while
it is at once progressive and technologically advanced, it also stands in the
spirit and defense of longstanding, traditional reporting methods. Many
journalists said that SecureDrop tips are just like any other tip and that
the technology is very similar to others in its basic efficacy.
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McKie of The Globe and Mail specifically characterized SecureDrop as a
channel alongside other channels:
When we were pitching this idea to our newsroom leadership, one of the
things that we were careful to point out is that the purpose of SecureDrop
for us is to provide a door into the newsroom, alongside all of the others.
We’re not telling people to stop calling us, we’re not telling them to stop
emailing us, we’re not telling people to stop mailing us the generic manila
envelope or sliding it under the door. All of the ways that people are get-
ting in touch with us are still valid, it’s just that in this day and age, there
are certain kinds of sources who don’t feel comfortable using those kinds of
means anymore—and potentially, with really good reason.
Additionally, journalists often weigh SecureDrop against other channels
when they are considering how to handle sensitive documents. Rich of
The Washington Post said, “For large files, I would prefer a physical hand
off, especially for something that sensitive.” This highlights a point worth
remembering: Even with a tool as advanced as SecureDrop, it is wise to
consider the entire range of approaches at your disposal when security is a
concern.





I spoke to representatives of ten news organizations for this study, and
nine told me that they regularly receive useful tips or publish stories based
on information provided to them directly through SecureDrop. Still, one
of the questions that looms over SecureDrop, much like any unfamiliar
technology, is whether it is worth the trouble.
One of the ironies inherent in SecureDrop, and perhaps in any technol-
ogy that facilitates anonymous leaking, is that its openness both enables
the collection of incredibly valuable information that could not have been
attained otherwise, and also attracts absolute garbage that most reporters
go to considerable lengths to keep as far from their desks as possible. The
same anonymity measures that protect vulnerable sources from danger
make it practically impossible to block, filter, or otherwise discourage those
with nothing valuable to share.
Nevertheless, most reporters were adamant that the trouble of installing
and maintaining a SecureDrop system has been worth it, whether it is
measured on journalistic value, financial return, or moral principle.
McKie of The Globe and Mail said that when the question of installing
SecureDrop was first raised in the newsroom, they crunched the numbers
for the equipment and installation expenses, as well as for the regular labor
hours that the system would require. “We decided that it was a relatively
small amount of money,” he said, “and if we got one story out of it, we
would consider that a success—and anything else was gravy.”
McKie added that the first SecureDrop story arrived “pretty much im-
mediately,” and that the system has proved consistently useful over its first
year—although, like my other informants, he was not willing to disclose
which stories or exactly how many The Globe and Mail has published based
on material gathered through SecureDrop.
Cook of Gawker voiced a similar sentiment:
It’s a hassle, but it’s worth it, even if it’s just one story a year. And a
big part of it, for me, was just messaging to our readers and our commu-
nity that we take security seriously, and that we’re investing our time and
resources into ensuring that for the exceedingly small fraction of our read-
ership that actually has information to share, and the inclination to do it,
that there’s a way for them to do it that safeguards their identity.
Gellman also underlined the importance of opening secure channels to
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provide for sources who would not contact the press otherwise. In his case,
the source was Edward Snowden, who reached out to Gellman because he
was one of the few reporters using PGP email at the time.
And even though Snowden’s case is pointed and quite persuasive, it
is worth foregrounding other reporters’ insistence that secure communi-
cation tools like SecureDrop would be worthwhile even if it did not yield
blockbuster stories. “Nobody’s expecting to get another Snowden just be-
cause we set up SecureDrop. There may never be another Snowden,” said
McKie. “We always have to be aware of the fact that not every source we
get through SecureDrop is going to have some massive, earth-shaking rev-
elation, but there are definitely more Snowdens out there in the sense of
people who will not get in touch with us unless we give them this option, as
opposed to the other options.”
Framing SecureDrop this way highlights its need as both humble and
urgent. Source protection is a basic and essentially undisputed journalistic
value. But the legal and technological considerations to meet this need have
become dramatically more complicated as unchecked powers of surveillance
have been tacitly granted to several world powers. SecureDrop is not meant
to amplify or augment the reporting capabilities of a newsroom, but rather
to help ensure the conditions of source protection that are necessary for a
healthy press.
“The way that I conceived it, this is not a dangle to lure people into
giving you stories that you would not otherwise have gotten,” Poulsen said.
“It’s a system that is set up just for you to communicate with me safely. So
if people are using SecureDrop instead of sending me an email, if they’re
using it instead of calling me on the phone, then SecureDrop has proven its






Appendix: Data Gathering and Cleaning 75
Data on the number of PGP key registrations in each newsroom was
gathered by scraping the MIT key server in March of 2016.15 Registrations
on the MIT server have considerable, if not total, overlap with other key
servers because they synchronize data with one another.
Each employee was identified by the supplied email address attached
to their news organization. Three concerns should be noted here: Anyone
can register a PGP key to a particular email address, even if they do not
own that account; new email addresses can be added to a registry at a later
date; and not every journalist who is using encrypted email will be doing
it on their work account. These are the main limitations in the coverage of
the data presented here.
Other problems, such as duplicate entries, were fixed by manually clean-
ing the data. Many people, over time, have registered several different keys.
Some people register more than one in a single day, perhaps in the midst of
a tutorial. Many others choose to revoke an existing key and register a new
one at some point in time. Whatever the case, duplicates were eliminated
from this report’s data, wherever possible. Each entry in which two or more
keys were registered under the same name, or under clear variations of one
person’s name, were also manually deleted. Only the earliest registration
was maintained so that timelines would not include later registrations from
the same individual. Thus, each entry should reflect their earliest enroll-
ment with encryption keys.
This condition has one notable but largely unavoidable effect on the
data: Sometimes a security-savvy reporter will move to a new organization
but their entry is still counted for their previous employer, where they first
enrolled their encryption keys. It’s worth emphasizing that the numbers as-
sociated with each organization should not be read as figures for total staff
using encryption, but rather for the number of staff who enrolled their first
encryption key at that organization. This number becomes less accurate
and less useful at organizations with a longer history of registrations, such
as those that stretch back to the 1990s.
Key registrations for a news organization are also not necessarily jour-
nalists. Especially in the earlier key registrations in this data set, it is clear
that many were working in the information technology department. Thus,
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some of these registrations do not indicate that an employee has set up
encryption for the sake of communicating with sources.
Finally, entries for general addresses like contact@ or tips@ each site
were removed. While these may be useful avenues for secure communica-
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